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WHEN MAKING MONEY IS MORE IMPORTANT THAN SAVING 
LIVES: REVISITING THE FORD PINTO CASE 
 
Stuart Strother, Azusa Pacific University 
 
Despite a long tradition of ethics training in business colleges, managers commonly make 
unethical business decisions. This paper reports a five-year study of ethical decision making of 
business students (n = 192). In an undergraduate microeconomics course, students were 
presented with financial data from the infamous Ford Pinto case where defective engineering, 
coupled with unethical management behavior, resulted in a number of fiery fatalities. Facing 
the decision to repair the cars or pay the estimated costs of lost wrongful death lawsuits, 56.8% 
of students chose to pay for the deaths. This paper describes the classroom experiment and uses 
logistic regression to compare the characteristics of the group choosing the correct ethical 
decision (repair the cars), with the group choosing the incorrect ethical decision (pay for the 
deaths).  
 
 
Keywords: ethics, Ford Pinto, college students 
 
INTRODUCTION  
 
On a long enough timeline the survival rate for everyone drops to zero. I was a recall 
coordinator, my job was to apply the formula: A new car built by my company leaves 
somewhere traveling at 60 mph, the rear differential locks up, the car crashes and burns 
with everyone trapped inside. Now should we initiate a recall? Take the number of vehicles 
in the field A, multiply it by the probable rate of failure B, multiply the result by the average 
out of court settlement C (A x B x C = X). If X is less than the cost of the recall, we don’t 
do one. Narrator, Fight Club [Motion picture]. 
 
Despite a long tradition of ethics training in business colleges, managers regularly make 
unethical business decisions. This paper reports a five-year study of ethical decision making of 
business students. In an undergraduate microeconomics course, students (n = 192) were presented 
with financial data from the infamous Ford Pinto case where defective engineering coupled with 
unethical management behavior resulted in a number of fiery fatalities. Facing the decision to 
repair the cars, or pay the estimated costs of lost wrongful death lawsuits, 56.8% of students chose 
to pay for the deaths. This paper recounts the Ford Pinto case, describes various ethical decision 
criteria, details the classroom experiment, then reports the results of the study. 
 
THE FORD PINTO CASE 
 
In 1971, the Ford Motor Company rolled out the Pinto to compete with economical 
subcompact imports such as cars made by Toyota and Volkswagen. A pet project of Ford president 
Lee Iacocca, the Pinto represented significant changes in American automotive manufacturing; the 
car offered drivers 38 highway miles per gallon of gasoline, weighed about 2,000 pounds and was 
priced at no more than $2,000 (Shaw, 2005).  
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But this popular vehicle had a fatal defect. A 20 mph rear-end collision collapsed the gas 
tank, spilling fuel, which would then ignite the car. The impact crumpled the car’s body so the 
doors could not open, effectively sealing the driver and passengers in an inferno. These results 
were discovered during crash tests of prototypes and the actual car. Ford management’s 
“compressed schedule” precluded design changes as the production tooling was in place prior to 
completion of the crash tests (Shaw, 2005, p. 71).  
 
Despite knowledge of the Pinto’s dangers, Ford rushed to produce and sell the car in 1971, 
one year before known National Highway Traffic Safety Administration standards were to be 
implemented that aimed to reduce fiery crashes. The Pinto did not meet the new safety standards, 
and rather than correct the defect, Ford instead “successfully lobbied, with extraordinary vigor and 
some blatant lies” against the safety standard (Dowie, 1977, p. 20).  
 
Costs of correcting the defect were estimated at only “$5 to $8 per vehicle” (Shaw, 2005, 
p. 72) plus unknown but likely costly production line modifications. From 1971 to 1980 3.1 million 
Pintos were sold, and Ford faced $15 million to $24 million in recall costs. Around that same time, 
the NHTSA had estimated “society loses $200,725 every time a person is killed in an auto 
accident” (Shaw, 2005, p. 72). So the decision to not repair the vehicles had a break-even point 
somewhere between 77 and 123 lives.  
 
From 1971 to 1980 hundreds of deaths occurred, and Ford faced over 100 lawsuits. In the 
widely publicized Grimshaw case, in 1972 Lily Gray’s Pinto stalled while merging onto a 
California freeway. She was rear-ended, the car caught fire, and Ms. Gray died. Her 13-year old 
passenger Richard Grimshaw received disfiguring burns (Mcintosh, 2001). A jury awarded $3 
million in compensatory damages to the victims, and hit Ford with $125 million in punitive 
damages, which were later reduced to $3.5 million. Most of the other lawsuits were settled 
privately out of court, and so the true costs to Ford remain unknown. 
 
Ford corrected the defect in 1980, but hundreds had already been killed or injured, and the 
lawsuit damages paid by Ford must have greatly exceeded the estimated repair costs of $15 million 
to $24 million. According to a damning article in Mother Jones, “Ford waited eight years because 
its internal ‘cost-benefit analysis,’ which places a dollar value on human life, said it wasn’t 
profitable to make the changes sooner” (Dowie, 1977, p. 20).  
 
In the court of public opinion, it is widely agreed Ford made the incorrect decision to not 
modify the cars but instead plan to pay out the anticipated wrongful death lawsuits. Numerous 
managers at the Ford Motor Company had undoubtedly graduated with business degrees and had 
participated in formal ethics training at business schools. Why, then, did they make the incorrect 
ethical decision, and why do managers today continue to make unethical decisions? 
 
ETHICS 
 
Supreme Court Justice Potter Stewart once stated, “Ethics is knowing the difference 
between what you have a right to do and what is right to do” (as cited in Baker and Lesch, 2013, 
p. 322). A business manager’s decisions when facing moral dilemmas at work largely depend on 
their ethical standards which have some basis in philosophy such as deontology and teleology. 
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Similarly, adhering to a religion such as Judaism or Christianity influences adherents to choose 
correct instead of incorrect behavior. In the present study, students presented with the Ford Pinto 
case were enrolled at a Christian university whose professors espouse both Judaic and Christian 
ideas of correct behavior, therefore those relevant ideas are included below. 
 
Deontology, the science of duty, encourages correct decisions. Koven (2015) notes, “in a 
deontological system, duties, rules and obligations are determined by some higher power” and 
“acts are morally wrong or right in themselves” (p. 3). Immanuel Kant and John Rawls provide 
deontological influence in ethics. Kant’s (1785) concept of categorical imperative suggests moral 
obligations are always binding in all situations including business decisions, meaning a person 
should always make the right decision regardless of context. Despite motives such as profit 
maximization, complying with orders from a supervisor, or avoiding getting fired, a person should 
always make upright choices. Rawls (1971) broadly addressing the problem of distributive justice 
offers ideas of liberty (every member of society deserves maximum freedom so long as their 
freedom does not impinge on another’s freedom) and justice (inequalities are allowed so long as 
society’s poorest members are not worse off). Had Ford engineers and managers considered 
categorical imperative and Rawlsian Justice they might have followed their own moral compass 
(categorical imperative) and favored consumers over company stakeholders (justice), including 
shareholders and managers, rather than surrendering to pressure from executives. Coase’s (1937) 
theory of the firm predicts managers act with profit maximization in mind, but the principal-agent 
problem suggests middle managers may also act to protect their own interests, such as jockeying 
for favorable performance evaluations, promotions, and bonuses. Managers may go along with 
executives’ incorrect ethical decisions in order to protect their own interests.  
 
Teleology suggests decisions should be made following the principle of “the greatest good 
for the greatest number” (Luke, 1994, p. 398). Teleology is consistent with the idea of 
utilitarianism, the prevailing ethical doctrine in play at Ford when executives decided not to build 
additional safety features in the Pinto. But the Pinto case ended utilitarianism; as Chewning notes, 
“Utilitarianism as a defense against personal harm and injury promptly died, never to be argued 
again in the public domain” (2011, p. 28). Ford’s cost benefit-analysis favoring shareholder wealth 
over customer safety was perceived as extremely callous, and utilitarianism evolved into a mostly 
discredited ethical standard. Teleology may encourage decision makers to consider the 
optimization of expenditures on safety. If Ford maximized safety features, the car may have been 
too costly to produce. By contrast, excluding all safety features from the car’s design could result 
in profit maximization. The simple concept of “optimal expenditures on safety” remains 
problematic to implement. Nonetheless, in the Pinto case, society has spoken that the level of 
safety features built into the Ford Pinto are far below any optimal safety standard. 
 
Numerous Jewish teachings admonish adherents to practice moral and ethical behavior that 
apply to business contexts. For example, texts in the Torah admonish caring for the poor by leaving 
part of the harvest in the field (Leviticus 19: 10), not stealing (Leviticus 19: 11), not lying 
(Leviticus 19: 12), not practicing fraud and not withholding wages from workers (Leviticus 19: 
13). Abundant passages in the book of Proverbs warn about unethical business practices, such as 
“A false balance is abomination to the Lord, but a just weight is his delight” (11: 1, KJV). Had 
engineers and managers at Ford followed Jewish principles, it is likely the Pinto rollout would 
have been delayed until safety modifications could be implemented. 
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Christianity also provides profuse guidelines for moral and ethical business behavior, with 
two major ideas. First, people are accountable to God for all of our actions. Jesus taught “No man 
can serve two masters: for either he will hate the one and love the other…ye cannot serve God and 
mammon” (Matthew 6: 24, KJV). The apostle Paul admonished the Colossians, “And whatsoever 
ye do, do it heartily, as to the Lord, and not unto men” (2: 23, KJV). Had Ford employees held 
themselves accountable to God instead of executives or shareholders, they likely would not have 
released a product they knew was defective. The second major principle of Christianity related to 
business ethics is the Golden Rule. Jesus taught “Therefore all things whatsoever ye would that 
men should do to you, do ye even so to them” (Matthew 7:12, KJV). Ford employees with 
knowledge of the Pinto’s dangers would likely avoid purchasing such a car for themselves, but 
they were willing to sell the Pinto to others, violating the Golden Rule.  
 
A person’s business decisions may be influenced by how they think philosophically and 
religiously. But thinking right is not the same as acting right. Employees at all levels of an 
organization must exercise ethical behavior, and yet ultimate responsibility lies with a company’s 
executives. According to Koven (2015), “ultimately, ethical ambiguities must be transformed by 
pragmatic leaders into specific directives, prescriptions, and proscriptions of behavior” (p. 1). 
 
PRESENTING THE FORD PINTO CASE TO STUDENTS 
 
Four decades after the actual Ford Pinto disaster, the case was presented to students at a 
large Christian university, with over 100 years’ history, and recently ranked among the top 200 
national universities by US News and World Report (Best Colleges). The four-year degree 
includes one required ethics course, Senior Seminar: Business Ethics, and the business school 
claims it informally integrates ethics into every course, building “a reputation for pragmatic and 
ethically based education” (About SBM). But instructors for the ethics course independently select 
readings, which may or may not include core ethics texts. Additionally, approximately one-fifth 
of business students fulfill their graduation requirement by taking the Senior Seminar course in 
another discipline such as communications or political science. It is possible a business student 
could complete a bachelor’s degree with little to no formal instruction in business ethics.  
 
The university’s general studies curriculum includes five courses in biblical studies, and, 
like ethics, the Christian faith is expected to be integrated into all business courses. Faith 
integration in the classroom typically consists of reading a scripture passage, discussing the general 
principles of the passage, then applying those principles to a business context. While all employees 
of the university are required to sign a short statement of faith, and are presumably practicing 
Christians, some professors express experiencing difficulty integrating faith into their specific 
disciplines, especially for the quantitative courses. Other subjects, however, are a more natural fit 
for faith-based discussion in the classroom. 
 
This author presented the Ford Pinto case to business students in a required sophomore-
level microeconomics course. There are no prerequisites for this course, and the course is not a 
prerequisite for other courses. On average, students were sophomores or juniors (see Table 1, class 
mean = 2.84) and had already completed more than half of their required 126 units toward 
graduation (see Table 1, units mean = 89.4) 
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Prior to being presented with the Ford Pinto case, the typical student would have completed 
two or three of the biblical studies courses, which include teachings on moral living but do not 
include explicit teaching of ethical behavior in the marketplace. One alumnus recently reported in 
response to the 2014 alumni survey online, “There was not much of an emphasis on integrating 
ethics in all classes, except for in ethics class.” Perhaps business school leaders assume students 
will learn ethics serendipitously through religious education, rather than intentionally through 
formal ethics training.  
 
When the Pinto case was presented, most of the course had been completed already 
including the study of markets, marginal analysis, supply and demand, and cost curves. In the 
course, students are exposed to pro-business ideas such as Coase’s (1937) theory of the firm and 
Milton Friedman’s (1970) essay, “The Social Responsibility of Business is to Make a Profit,” but 
also contrasting ideas through biblical faith integration exercises that instruct students to be honest, 
act justly, and care for the poor and the environment. These theoretical lessons encourage students 
to widely consider multiple stakeholders in their analysis of business decisions, including firms, 
individuals and governments.  
 
The case was presented verbally in class, accompanied with a short but disturbing video of 
a test crash wherein a Pinto was rear-ended, the gas tank exploded igniting the car, the car’s body 
crumpled, and the doors could only be opened with excessive force. The graphic video included 
crash test dummies violently jolted and catching fire. Figure 1 is a screen shot from the video. The 
written assignment rubric included the following case description:  
 
You are a business analyst working at the Ford Motor Company in 1976. The new Ford 
Pinto has sold well in its first year of production, but there have been some challenges. The 
subcompact product category is crowded with competitors’ cars such as the Honda Civic, 
the AMC Gremlin, and the Chevy Vega. Additionally, some people have been injured or 
killed in fiery Pinto collisions. Conduct a cost curve analysis following the guidelines 
below and write a business report directed to Ford management.  
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Figure 1. Ford Pinto Fiery Test Crash 
 
Students were given Ford Pinto production data including output, total costs, and total fixed 
costs. The assignment required students to calculate numerous statistics for each daily output level 
including average costs, daily profit, annual profit and others. They were to present their 
calculations in tables and graphs. Figure 2 shows the key graph illustrating three annual profit 
comparisons which are 1) $75 million profit without this dilemma, 2) $67 million in anticipated 
profit if the company chooses to not repair the cars, but pay the predicted wrongful death settlement 
amounts, and 3) $50 million in profit if the company spends $100 per car to fix the cars. Due to 
economies of scale the lines on the graph slope upward, but then slope downward due to 
diseconomies of scale. 
 
Regarding students’ final decisions to plan to pay the costs of lost wrongful death lawsuits 
or to repair the cars, this instructor was careful to avoid bias and provide neutral advice to students 
with statements such as, “Once you’ve completed accurate calculations, use whatever criteria you 
choose to make your decision, such as relying solely on profit maximization calculations, 
following some ethical criteria, or any other information you wish to use.” Students were informed 
the wrongful death outcome included the death of the driver and/or passengers, and the lawsuit 
damages would be paid to surviving relatives. 
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Figure 2. Annual Profit Comparisons from the Class Assignment 
 
RESULTS OF THE CLASSROOM EXPERIMENT 
 
Of the 192 students across five years in the Principles of Microeconomics course, 56.8% 
chose to not repair the cars, but instead to plan to pay the anticipated costs of the wrongful death 
lawsuits, which were estimated to be 16 wrongful deaths per year with settlement amounts of 
$500,000. This decision resulted in annual profit of $67 million for Ford per year, as compared to 
just $50 million in annual profit if the company repaired the cars (see Figure 2).  
 
Table 1 reports descriptive statistics for all 192 students, the 107 students who chose to pay 
for deaths, and the 85 students who chose to repair the cars. Independent group mean comparisons 
were conducted using the t-distribution which are also reported in Table 1.  
 
Students who chose to not fix the cars had slightly higher GPAs (mean = 3.27 vs. 3.24); 
perhaps focusing more on performing “correctly” on the assignment, rather than making a correct 
ethical decision. Those students had also completed more academic units (mean = 96.76 vs. 87.25) 
and this difference was statistically significant (t = 2.53, p = 0.012). This finding is especially 
disheartening, as students who have spent more time in business school are expected to exhibit 
more ethical behavior, however this result may be an indicator of student fatigue; the longer they 
spend in college, the less engaged they become.  
 
Students who chose not to fix the faulty vehicles also scored lower on this assignment 
(mean = 74.94 vs. 83.51) and these results were statistically significant (t = -5.12, p = 0.00); this 
was partly due to a -5 percent penalty for making the “wrong” decision. An explanation followed 
that this decision was wrong primarily due to making an unethical choice, but also wrong 
numerically in that all forecasted profits were not to be realized due to costs of wrongful death 
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lawsuits greatly exceeding the predicted $500,000 per case. Choosing profits over human lives is 
always a wrong decision. 
 
Table 1. Descriptive Statistics 
 mean median st. dev.  range diff. t  
All students (n = 192)        
     pay for deaths (1 = yes, 0 = no) 0.57 0.50 0.49 1.00    
     female (1 = yes, 0 = no) 0.48 0.00 0.50 1.00    
     GPA 3.22 3.26 0.39 1.90    
     class ( 1 = freshman…4 = senior) 2.84 3.00 0.77 3.00    
     units 89.40 87.00 27.00 148.00    
     grade 78.70 80.00 12.20 60.00    
Students who chose to pay for the wrongful deaths (n =107) 
     female 0.47 0.00 0.50 1.00    
     GPA 3.27 3.32 0.39 1.94    
     class 2.85 3.00 0.76 4.00    
     units 96.76 91.00 24.51 115.00    
     grade 74.94 76.00 10.97 51.00    
Students who chose to repair the cars (n = 85) 
     female 0.54 1.00 0.50 1.00 -0.07 -1.07  
     GPA 3.24 3.24 0.37 1.75 0.032 0.58  
     class 2.82 3.00 0.79 4.00 0.03 0.27  
     units 87.25 82.00 27.55 138.00 9.51 2.53 ** 
     grade 83.51 87.00 12.18 60.00 -8.57 -5.12 *** 
* p ≤ .10. ** p ≤ .05. *** p ≤ .01.  
 
Figure 3 shows student decisions by major. Accounting majors had the best ethical 
behavior with only 38% refusing to fix the cars, and finance majors displayed the worst ethical 
behavior with 79% choosing the wrongful death option. We may speculate these accounting 
students were exposed to more discussions of ethical principles in their coursework as accounting 
curriculum tends to include references to the AICPA code, IMA Code and others. 
 
Figure 3. Students Choosing to Not Fix Cars/Pay for Wrongful Deaths (n = 192) 
79%
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40%
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Logistic regression analysis was also conducted on the data set and three subsets 
(marketing, accounting and management majors) classifying students in two categories (1 = pay 
for wrongful deaths, and 0 = fix the cars). Other majors were excluded due to small samples. These 
results are shown in Table 2. Each of the four models was statically robust (pseudo R2 > .15).  
The model including all 192 students showed results consistent with the t-tests reported above. 
Females were less likely to make the decision to not fix the vehicles (B = -.364), and students with 
higher GPAs were more likely to pay for wrongful deaths (B = .525), but these results were not 
statistically significant in this data set, limiting our ability make inference beyond this data set, 
however for these 192 students, males and academic high-performers did make the incorrect 
choice more frequently as compared to females and low-performers. Students were more likely to 
pay for wrongful deaths if they had completed more academic units (B = .018, p < .01), or if they 
received a low grade on the assignment (B = -.040, p < .01). These last two findings are statistically 
significant. 
 
Marketing students (n = 30) were more likely to make the incorrect decision if they had 
completed more academic units (B = .063, p < .10). Accounting students (n = 21) were more likely 
to make the wrong decision if they received a lower grade on the assignment (B = -.150, p < .10). 
Management majors (n = 88) were more likely to make the wrong decision if they had a high GPA 
(B = 2.179, p < .05), and if they received a lower grade on the assignment (B = -.111, p < .01).  
Although finance majors were excluded from the logistic regression due to small numbers in the 
dataset, we may speculate finance majors had the worst ethical behavior (79% chose not to repair 
the cars) due to a stronger emphasis in the finance curriculum on accurate numerical calculations, 
rather than on ethical behavior.  
 
Table 2. Logistic regression classifying students in two categories (1 = pay for wrongful deaths, 
0 = fix the cars) 
 All Marketing Accounting Management 
  B   B   B   B   
female  -.364  ‡  ‡  -.632  
GPA .525  1.330  ‡  2.179 ** 
units .018 *** .063 * .016  -.001  
grade -.040 *** -.061   -.150 * -.111 *** 
constant 1.268  -5.708  10.977  2.868  
pseudo R2 †† .186  .408  .273  .335  
-2 Log  234.049  30.168  23.915  91.619  
% correct 70.3  70.0  71.4  72.7  
n 192   30   21   88   
* p ≤ .10 
** p ≤ .05 
*** p ≤ .01        
† = removed due to multicollinearity         
‡ = removed due to small sample size         
†† = Nagelkerke R2 
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ASSIGNMENT DEBRIEF 
 
Upon returning the students’ papers, a classroom discussion followed, wherein students 
were informed they made an incorrect ethical decision if they chose to plan to pay the costs of the 
wrongful death lawsuits instead of making the correct ethical decision to repair the cars. The 
Grimshaw case was discussed, with an emphasis on the $6.5 million settlement, which far 
exceeded the $500,000 initially estimated cost of each wrongful death lawsuit. Not only had these 
students made an incorrect ethical choice in favor of profits, no profits would actually materialize. 
In fact, applying the Grimshaw payout of $6.5 million, the company would not earn the estimated 
$67 million per year, but instead lose $29 million per year. Students were informed their decisions 
mirrored the actual Ford case, with managers making an unethical decision that ultimately did not 
materialize in maximized profits. 
 
As noted above, students who chose wrongly were more likely to be upperclassmen and 
students with higher GPAs. The latter group tend to be grade-conscious and were disappointed to 
learn not only did they make an unethical decision, but in doing so, they earned a lower grade on 
the assignment. Lively, and sometimes emotional, discussions ensued. Numerous students 
vigorously defended their decision to plan to pay for the wrongful deaths. Their justifications 
largely fell into three broad categories.  
 
The most common justification was, “I only made this decision because it is a college 
paper; if I was an actual employee at Ford with lives on the line, I would never make this decision.” 
This is a logical fallacy, as the stakes are very low on a college paper, as compared to making 
monetary and safety decisions with real people’s lives. To say I am only unethical in small matters 
but would be ethical in large matters is not credible.  
 
The second most common excuse was, “I made my decision based on economics, not based 
on human lives or ethics.” This finding is especially disturbing. Some consider “business” to only 
be about profits (cf. theory of the firm), but the field of economics more broadly considers not just 
microeconomic factors such as firm profits and consumer utility, but a wider view of stakeholders 
including overall societal welfare. These students were informed that ideas of profit maximization 
and the theory of the firm should only be applied within the confines of ethical behavior. 
 
A third excuse given the instructor was, “I only made this decision because I thought it was 
the decision you wanted.” Students were informed the instructor would prefer they make ethical 
decisions. Some students felt tricked, and others were saddened with themselves that they failed 
the ethical test. Emotions ran high. This troubling finding is most consistent with the actual case. 
Milgram’s (1974) research on obedience is informative here. It is likely executives at Ford shifted 
moral responsibility to the engineers and business managers, who in turn shifted their sense of 
responsibility back to the executives. Members of an organization are more likely to make 
incorrect ethical decisions when they can shift blame away from themselves personally, either up 
or down the organizational chart.  
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DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
 
Despite decades of scholarship and teaching on ethics in business schools, managers regularly 
make unethical decisions. Numerous ethics journals exist, and nearly all business schools integrate 
ethical teaching into the business curriculum, but unethical behavior occurs quite regularly in the 
marketplace. Ethicists have an unrealistic expectation that, given proper training, people will act 
correctly. A more realistic approach might be that ethical training may only provide a nudge such 
a that a person may become more ethical, whereas expecting people to always act correctly may 
be unrealistic. Perhaps an “optimal level of ethical behavior” exists and business school training 
can contribute a nudge to increase ethical behavior while not completely eliminating all unethical 
behavior. This idea of a nudge along the ethical continuum is illustrated in Figure 4.  
 
Figure 4. Optimal level of Ethical Behavior 
 
A caveat regarding this study is the weakness of simulation; ethical decision-making in a 
classroom is not the same as decision-making at an actual firm such as at the Ford Motor Company 
where real people may be harmed due to poor ethical decisions by company employees. 
Additionally, ethical behavior by managers at real companies may be encouraged through efforts 
such as explicitly stating ethical standards and enacting whistleblower systems. The results of this 
study are descriptive of a large group of college students, and we may only cautiously make 
inference from these results toward actual decision-makers at actual companies. Had the 
simulation taken place in the fourth-year Business Ethics course, it is possible different results 
would be produced.  
 
This paper reports the results of a five-year study of business school ethical behavior. 
Students were introduced to the Ford Pinto case in the context of the cost curves portion of a 
sophomore level microeconomics course. It is widely agreed executives and managers made the 
incorrect ethical choice to produce the Ford Pinto knowing the car was dangerous, and 56.8% of 
students did not differ from the actual employees of the Ford Motor Company. For less than $100, 
the defective gas tank could have been modified, dramatically improving the safety of the car, 
presumably preventing hundreds of deaths and injuries. This paper contributes a finding relevant 
to the ethics literature, that despite decades of ethical training in business schools, students remain 
willing to make unethical choices in favor of profits. It is beyond the scope of this paper to suggest 
improvements in ethics training; but this study provides evidence there is more work to be done in 
training ethical leaders of the future.  
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APPENDIX A: THE ASSIGNMENT RUBRIC 
 
Principles of Microeconomics, Business Report #3 
Case Description:   
You are a business analyst working at the Ford Motor Company in 1976. The new Ford Pinto has sold well in its first year of production, but there 
have been some challenges. The subcompact product category is crowded with competitors’ cars such as the Honda Civic, the AMC Gremlin, and 
the Chevy Vega. Additionally, some people have been injured or killed in fiery Pinto collisions. Conduct a cost curve analysis following the 
guidelines below and write a business report (APA style) directed to Ford management.  
    
Introduction and Case Description (maximum 100 words)     10%   _____ 
 Describe the Ford Pinto. 
 Explain the subcompact car market structure (quote the textbook if necessary).  
 Briefly introduce the major sections of this report. 
    
Cost Curves (maximum 100 words)        20%   _____ 
 Write a paragraph describing Table 1, Figure 1 and Figure 2. 
 Complete Table 1, Figure 1 and Figure 2 and include them in your report.  
 
Normal Profit Maximization (maximum 100 words)      30%   _____ 
 Write a paragraph describing the data in Table 2. Also note the breakeven price and shutdown price. 
 The market price is $2,000. Recommend the quantity to produce. 
 If the market price for subcompact cars falls to $1,500, how many Pintos, if any, should Ford produce? 
 Complete Table 2 below and include it in your report. (Annual profit is daily profit x 250 workdays). 
    
Revised Profit Calculations (maximum 150 words)      30%   _____ 
 The Ford Pinto was found to have a defective gas tank. The company can fix the cars for $100 additional cost, or they will have 
to pay on average $500,000 in wrongful death lawsuits lost. Write a paragraph describing this situation and the data in Table 3 and 
Figure 3.  
 Complete Table 3 and include it in your report (daily cost = $100 x output, cost of deaths = WDLL *$500k) 
 Complete Figure 3 showing all three annual profit calculations.  
 State the maximum profit if Ford fixes the cars or if Ford decides to pay the cost of deaths.  
 State whether Ford should fix the cars or pay the cost of deaths, and what quantity to produce. 
   
Conclusion (maximum 50 words)        10%   _____ 
 Summarize the analyses above, restating your key decisions. 
   
Mechanics (factored into above score) 
 Spelling, grammar, punctuation, etc. 
 Graphs and tables have clear titles and labels. 
 Descriptions and explanations of tables and graphs precede the tables and graphs. 
 Page format according to APA style. 
 Correct in-text citations according to APA style. 
 Accurate References page according to APA style. 
    
Total Score:          100% _____ 
 
 
 
Table 1. Output of Ford Pintos, Per Workday, Year 1976 
Output TC TFC TVC AFC AVC ATC MC 
600 $1,300,000 $1,000,000  x x x x 
700 $1,400,000 $1,000,000      
800 $1,500,000 $1,000,000      
900 $1,600,000 $1,000,000      
1,000 $1,700,000 $1,000,000      
1,100 $1,900,000 $1,000,000      
1,200 $2,300,000 $1,000,000      
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Figure 1. Total Costs, Fixed Costs and Variable Costs  
 
 
 
Figure 2. Average Fixed Costs, Average Variable Costs, Average Total Costs, Marginal Costs, 
and Price 
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Table 2. Normal Profit Calculations 
Output Price TR MR MC Daily Profit Annual Profit 
 600   $2,000    x   
 700   $2,000       
 800   $2,000       
 900   $2,000       
 1,000   $2,000       
 1,100   $2,000       
 1,200   $2,000       
 
Table 3. Revised Profit Calculations 
Output 
Daily Cost to Fix 
Cars (+$100) 
Revised Daily 
Profit 
Revised Annual 
Profit (fix cars) 
Wrongful Death 
Lawsuits Lost 
Cost of deaths 
($500,000 each) 
Revised Annual 
Profit (deaths) 
 600      4    
 700      6    
 800      9    
 900      14    
 1,000      16    
 1,100      25    
 1,200      35    
 
 
 
 
Figure 3. Profit Comparisons 
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